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THE STANDARD OF VACATUR FOR RULE B MARITIME ATTACHMENTS WAS
NOT MET
District Court was in error when it vacated Rule B Maritime Attachment
because it applied a "needs-plus-balancing" test. A District Court may
vacate a maritime attachment if defendant can show that (1) defendant is
subject to suit in convenient adjacent jurisdiction; (2) plaintiff could obtain
in personam jurisdiction over defendant in jurisdiction where plaintiff is
located; or (3) plaintiff has already obtained sufficient security for potential
judgment.
Aqua Stoli Shipping, LTD. v. Gardner Smith Pty LTD.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
460 F.3d 434
(Decided July 3 1, 2006)
In April, 2005 Aqua Stoli Shipping Ltd, ("Aqua Stoli") entered into charter with Gardner
Smith Pty Ltd. ("Gardner Smith") to carry cargo on the MN Aqua Stoli. Gardner Smith refused
to load the cargo, alleging the vessel was not seaworthy. Aqua Stoli disputed this rejection and,
subsequently, began an arbitration proceeding.
Aqua Stoli requested that Gardner Smith voluntarily post security for its claim. When
Gardner Smith refused to post such security, Aqua Stoli brought action in the Southern District
of New York seeking an ex parte attachment order under Supplemental Rule B, which allows
Aqua Stoli to attach any assets of Gardner Smith located within the district. Fed. R. Civ. P.
Supp. Rule B(l)(a). Judge Jed S. Rakoff granted the attachment subject to Rule E(4)(f), which
provides in pertinent part that " [defendant is] entitled to a prompt hearing at which plaintiff shall
be required to show why the arrest or attachment should not be vacated or other relief granted
consistent with these rules." Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. Rule E(4)(f).
The district court, following the Rule E(4)(f) hearing, held that a court could vacate an
attachment - even a prima facie valid attachment - if: ( 1) plaintiff can not show that the
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attachment was necessary to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the defendant; (2) plaintiff can
not show that the attachment was necessary to secure payment of a potential judgment; (3)
defendant can show that the attachment was sought simply to gain a tactical advantage; or (4)
defendant can show that the prejudice to the defendant outweighed the benefit to the plaintiff.
Aqua Stoli Shipping, Ltd v. Gardner Smith Pty, Ltd. , 384 F. Supp. 2d 729 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The
second circuit refers to this rationale as a "needs-plus-balancing" test.
The district court, applying the needs-plus-balancing test, found that Gardner Smith was
an on-going business with sufficient assets outside the district to satisfy any potential judgment.
The court also found that the burden placed on Gardner Smith was greater than the benefit to
Aqua Stoli because the interception of electronic fund transfers severely impaired Gardner
Smith's fmancial ability. The district court, therefore, vacated the attachment. Id. at 730. Aqua
Stoli appealed.
The issue on appeal to the second circuit is whether the district court erred when it
applied the needs-plus-balancing test to determine if an attachment should be vacated under
Supplemental Rule E(4)(f). The Second Circuit reviewed de novo because the issue dealt with
legal predicate for an exercise of discretion.
The Second Circuit looked to the history of the each rule. Prior to 1985, a defendant had
no clear right to contest an attachment. Due Process concerns, however, led to the addition of
r.ubsection (4)(f) to Rule E in 1985. Subsection (4)(f) was modeled on Local Rule 12, which
provided the attached party with an opportunity to contest the attachment. The Local Rules had
been created by Eastern and Southern Districts on New York to fill gaps that existed in national
rules. Unfortunately, the extent to which Local Rule 12 was adopted is unclear.
The Advisory Committee's notes to Rule E(4)(f) explain only that the subsection was
promulgated in order to provide post-deprivation hearing as required by Due Process. But, the
notes do not speak as to standards of vacatur. Both parties in this case argue that the second
circuit should look to pre-Rule E(4)(f) cases to determine the context under which subsection
(4)(f) was promulgated and what the standards for vacatur are.
The second circuit found that these pre-Rule E(4)(f) cases, although non-binding, do not
support Gardner Smith's position. The courts in these cases generally limited their review to the
textual requirements of the statutes providing for attachments. DIS AIS Flint v. Sabre Shipping
Corp. , 228 F.Supp. 384 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); see also Antco Shipping Co. v. Yukon Campania
Naviera, S.A., 318 F.Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Gardner Smith's reliance on Integrated to support the contention that district courts have
inherent equitable authority to vacate attachment orders on grounds of unfairness to the attached
party is misguided. In Integrated, the court refused to vacate an attachment because service of
process on the Secretary of State in Albany was not the equivalent of accepting service in the
Southern District. Noting potential for abuse, such as a plaintiff seeking an attachment in one
district even though a normal in personam suit could be maintained in another district within the
same state, the court stated that courts have an inherent authority to vacate such attachments.
Integrated Container Service, Inc. v. Starlines Container Shipping, Ltd, 476 F.Supp. 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
The Integrated decision, however, supports a limited vacatur standard. According to the
Second Circuit's interpretation of Integrated, an attachment is precluded only if the court could
exercise in personam jurisdiction and defendant could be found within the district. Critics have
called this test "arbitrary" because it presumes defendant's presence in the district vitiates
plaintiff's needs for security without accounting for the fmancial state of the defendant in that

district. Although this rule may be too broad, the second circuit believes that Congress chose a
less determinate rule to ensure that attachments may be obtained with minimal amount of
litigation.
It does not follow, however, that district courts are without any discretion to vacate
attachments.

As aforementioned, vacatur may be warranted in limited circumstances.

For

example, vacatur may also be appropriate when: ( 1 ) defendant is subject to suit in convenient

adjacent jurisdiction; (2) plaintiff could obtain in personam jurisdiction over defendant in district
where plaintiff is located; or (3) plaintiff has already obtained sufficient security for potential
judgment, by attachment or otherwise.

In the absence of any of these compelling reasons,

vacatur is appropriate only when plaintiff fails to sustain burden of showing that he has satisfied
requirements of Rules

B and E.

For the foregoing reasons, the Second Circuit held that the district court was in error
when it vacated the attachment.

The Second Circuit remanded the case for further proceeding

consistent with its decision.
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CHOICE OF FORUM OF JONES ACT SUIT NEED NOT BE PLACED IN COURT
THAT GRANTED RELIEF TO SIDPOWNER UNDER LIMITED LIABILITY ACT,
PROVIDED INJURED PARTY STIPULATES JONES ACT RECOVERY MAY NOT
EXCEED AMOUNT FIXED IN LIMITED LIABILITY ACTION.
Sanchez, a seaman allegedly injured aboard Inland Dredging Company,
LLC's vessel, s�mght to bring a Jones Act suit in the District Court in
Galveston against Inland Dredging to recover damages for personal injury.
However, Inland Dredging had petitioned to limit its liability to Sanchez in
the District Court in Mississippi and obtained an injunction restraining and
enjoining all claims and proceedings against Inland Dredging in any other
court. Sanchez made a motion, which was denied by the Mississippi District
Court, to dissolve this injunction, stipulating that he would not seek to
execute a judgment of the Galveston Court in excess of the limits prescribed
by the Mississippi Court. The Court of Appeals reversed the order appealed
from, granted the motion, and dissolved the injunction, thereby preserving
Sanchez's legally protected right to select his choice of forum.
Inland Dredging v. Sanchez
United ·states Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit
468 F.3d 864
(Decided October 27, 2006)
The appellant, Ricardo Sanchez, alleged that he suffered personal injuries while
employed as a seaman on the

MIA MS. PAULA, a vessel owned by Inland Dredging Company,
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